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723 
THE BLURRED PROTECTION FOR THE FEEL OR GROOVE 
OF A SONG UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW: EXAMINING THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF WILLIAMS V. GAYE ON CREATIVITY IN 
MUSIC 
Olivia Lattanza* 
I. INTRODUCTION   
The notion that “[a]ll music shares inspiration from prior 
musical works”1 creates a tension in music copyright infringement 
cases because the distinction between inspiration and copying of 
another musician’s work is often blurred.  In Williams v. Gaye,2 the 
Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the judgment of the district court entered 
after the jury verdict finding that Pharrell Williams’ and Robin 
Thicke’s (“Thicke Parties”)3 hit “Blurred Lines” infringed Marvin 
Gaye’s song “Got to Give It Up.”4  Although the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision turned on procedural grounds, namely the court’s deferential 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2020; Boston College, B.A. 
in Psychology, minor in Music, 2017.  I would like to give a special thanks to my Mom, Dad, 
and sister, Brittany, for their unconditional love and support in everything that I do.  I 
appreciate their devotion in always being there for me not only as my family, but as my best 
friends.  I would also like to thank my Nana and Uncle Don for their love and enthusiasm, and 
my Papa, who I know is excitedly watching down on me.  Next, thank you to Editor-in-Chief, 
Michael Morales, and Notes Editor, Thomas Narducci, for their continued guidance and 
encouragement throughout the writing and editing process.  Lastly, many thanks to my faculty 
advisor, Professor Rena Seplowitz, for introducing this Note topic to me, as it connects my 
passion for music and the law.  Professor Seplowitz’s assistance in providing extensive 
feedback, along with her unwavering dedication as both a faculty advisor and a professor, is 
truly invaluable. 
1 Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers in Support 
of Appellants at 2, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (CA No. 15-56880). 
2 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018). 
3 The Ninth Circuit uses “Thicke Parties” to represent Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, 
Clifford Harris, Jr., and More Water from Nazareth Publishing, Inc.  Id. at 1159.  For this 
Note, “Thicke Parties” will specifically focus on Williams and Thicke. 
4 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1183. 
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review of the jury’s decision,5 this case does not exemplify a 
straightforward application of copyright law for several reasons. 
While the 2013 hit “Blurred Lines” is subject to the protections 
under the Copyright Act of 1976, Gaye’s song, which was composed 
prior to January 1, 1978, is protected under the Copyright Act of 1909.6  
Specifically, Marvin Gaye (“Gaye”) recorded “Got to Give It Up” in 
1976, but he did not notate the deposit copy,7 as he neither wrote nor 
“fluently read sheet music.”8  Instead, Jobete Music Company, Inc. 
registered “Got to Give It Up” in 1977 with the Copyright Office by 
depositing sheet music of a transcribed version of Gaye’s recorded 
song.9  After Gaye’s death, Frankie Christian Gaye, Nona Marvisa 
Gaye, and Marvin Gaye III (“Gaye Parties”) inherited the copyright in 
Gaye’s song.10  Notably, the difference in copyright protection under 
each act is central in determining which aspects of the song are 
protected.11  While the actual sound recording of “Blurred Lines” is 
protected under the 1976 Act, the only protection of “Got to Give It 
Up” under the 1909 Act is in the musical composition.12    
As a result, the district court excluded the sound recordings of 
both songs because sound recordings are not protected under the 1909 
Act.13  This meant that the jury did not compare the recorded versions 
of both songs, but only compared the “musical compositions” of 
 
5 Id. at 1182. 
6 Id. at 1165; see Dolman v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708, 712 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The 1909 Act is 
the applicable law in cases in which creation and publication of a work occurred before 
January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act.”). 
7  A deposit copy is a copy of the copyright holder’s work that is sent to the Copyright 
Office as part of the application for registration.  For a musical work, the notation of a deposit 
copy is the process of writing the musical elements and lyrics of a song on the sheet music.  
The deposit copy, or the sheet music of the song, is then sent to the Copyright Office as part 
of the application for copyright registration.  Here, Gaye did not notate the deposit copy 
himself.  This means that he did not personally write or transcribe the notes, lyrics, and other 
musical elements of “Got to Give It Up” on the sheet music that was sent to the Copyright 
Office for registration. 
8 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1160. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  Gaye’s children inherited their father’s copyright in “Got to Give It Up” because 
copyrights, like other personal property, can be inherited when the copyright owner dies. 
11 Beth Hutchens, How Sweet it is to be Sued by You (for Copyright 
Infringement), IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/19/how-
sweet-it-is-to-be-sued-by-you-for-copyright-infringement/id=54955. 
12 Id. 
13 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1165.  For an explanation of the protection of sound recordings 
under the 1976 Act, see Part II.A. 
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elements extracted by the experts.14  The lack of similarities between 
the notated musical elements on the written compositions suggests that 
the songs are not substantially similar under the 1909 Act.15  In 
identifying the musical features present in both songs, the Gayes’ 
expert relied on elements that are not individually protectable.16  
However, if the two songs were evaluated under the 1976 Act, there 
may be a stronger argument that the songs are substantially similar.17  
Specifically, the sound recordings represent similar stylistic and sonic 
choices, including “the male falsetto and the use of a cowbell.”18  
However, as this case is governed under the 1909 Act, the similarities 
between the sound recordings are irrelevant.19   
Most importantly, the similarities between the songs are not 
within the melody, lyrics, or harmony, but rather in the overall sound, 
groove, and vibe.20  As the similarity in groove is not readily 
identifiable by looking at the musical compositions, the jury most 
likely found similarities based on the “mash-up” recording of the 
songs, which was inappropriately admitted because it contained 
unprotectable elements.21  While the actual sound recordings would be 
the best source for evaluating the similarity in groove, the jurors were 
most likely influenced by the Gaye Parties’ expert musicologists in 
 
14 David Post, Blurred Lines and Copyright Infringement, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/12/blurred-lines-and-
copyright-infringement/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.128eb87d3b5. 
15 See id. (“That the experts found similarities that are not apparent from simply listening 
to the two recordings should be . . . entirely irrelevant to the case.”).  
16 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1187 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
17 See Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Copyright Verdict Should Be Thrown Out, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-blurred-
lines-copyright-verdict-should-be-thrown-out.  If the Gaye family had a broader copyright 
under the 1976 Act, the family might have a stronger argument in having ownership of their 
father’s “particularly distinctive style choices.”  Id. 
18 Id.  In my opinion, while both songs used the cowbell and male falsetto voice, this does 
not indicate that the district court’s decision was correct.  In fact, the use of these sonic 
elements does not suggest that the similarities between the songs extended beyond the groove 
and feel.  Instead, it is possible that Williams and Thicke used the cowbell and falsetto voice 
for the main purpose of evoking a vibe similar to Gaye’s. 
19 See id. (explaining that the copyrights in the composition and the sound recording are 
distinct). 
20 Post, supra note 14. 
21 For an explanation of “mash-ups” in this case, see infra note 159 and accompanying text.  
At trial, the jury heard “three audio-engineered ‘mash-ups’” of the songs prepared by the Gaye 
Parties’ experts “to show the melodic and harmonic compatibility” of both songs.  On the other 
hand, the Thicke Parties’ expert “prepared and played a sound recording containing her 
rendition of the deposit copy of ‘Got To Give It Up.’”  Williams, 885 F.3d at 1162. 
3
Lattanza: The Blurred Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
726 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
determining that the songs had a similar vibe because the actual sound 
recordings were excluded.  Specifically, the jury found similarities in 
the groove based on the improper expert testimony on musical 
similarities “that were extraneous to the sheet music.”22  This Note 
supports the argument that the courts should reconsider how jurors are 
instructed in music copyright infringement cases because the jurors 
may have inaccurately evaluated the similarity in groove, which is not 
protectable, rather than comparing the protected musical elements.23  
Thus, this decision is groundbreaking as it improperly reinforces the 
notion that creating the “feel” of another song constitutes copyright 
infringement even if the melody and notes are completely different.24 
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the jury’s 
decision inappropriately expanded the scope of copyright protection to 
the feel or groove of a song.25  Virtually every song or musical work is 
inspired at least in part by some other artist or musical genre.26  By 
protecting the feel or groove of a song, the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
will substantially diminish the creative output of artists, regardless of 
whether the sound recordings or musical compositions are compared.27  
This Note will argue that the similarities in the overall feel in the 
intrinsic analysis stage28 should not result in copyright infringement, 
especially when the songs are only comparable in their musical style.  
Therefore, in music copyright infringement cases, the Ninth Circuit 
should create a more precise rule for determining the “total concept 
 
22 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 7. 
23 See Melinda Newman, Top Lawyers on What Songwriters Must Learn From ‘Blurred 
Lines’ Verdict, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2015, 12:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/melindanew 
man/2015/03/11/top-lawyers-weigh-in-on-the-blurred-lines-verdict-and-what-songwriters-
must-learn/#327891976bfa; see also Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 12 n.4. 
24 Taylor Turville, Emulating vs. Infringement: The “Blurred Lines” of Copyright Law, 38 
WHITTIER L. REV. 199, 199 (2018). 
25 See Wu, supra note 17 (predicting that the Ninth Circuit would reverse the district court’s 
holding against Thicke because it “was a mistake”).  As Wu’s article was written prior to the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision, it is interesting that he believed that Thicke would win the appeal.  
26 Turville, supra note 24, at 218. 
27 See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 3, 10; see also Randy Lewis, More Than 200 
Musicians Rally Behind Appeal of ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/la-et-ms-blurred-lines-appeal-musicians-
20160831-snap-story.html (“The friend of the court brief argues that the ‘Blurred Lines’ 
verdict was flawed and that if it remains on the books it would create a profound chilling effect 
in the creative community because the similarities . . . had more to do with the general feel 
rather than specific musical elements in common.”). 
28 See Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he subjective ‘intrinsic 
test’ asks whether an ‘ordinary, reasonable observer’ would find a substantial similarity of 
expression of the shared idea.” (citation omitted)). 
4
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and feel” of a work with respect to the feel of a song in the intrinsic 
analysis stage.29 
Part II of this Note will explain the essential elements of a 
copyrightable work under copyright law and a history of copyright law 
under the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act.  This section will also discuss 
originality and creativity in musical works and the extrinsic and 
intrinsic tests for substantial similarity in music copyright infringement 
cases.  Part III will analyze various music copyright infringement cases 
leading up to Williams v. Gaye.  Part IV will explore the background 
and procedural posture of this case, including the expert testimony by 
the parties’ expert musicologists and the arguments presented by the 
Thicke Parties on appeal.  Part V will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and its impact on the future of creativity in music.  This 
section will also examine whether the jury in this case, and in all music 
infringement cases, should be instructed differently when tasked with 
determining the substantial similarity between two songs.  Lastly, Part 
VI will conclude by summarizing the main points regarding the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision and the impact it will have on musicians who create 
songs that are inspired by other musical artists and genres. 
II. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. Scope of Protection Under the 1909 Act and the 
1976 Act 
In the United States Constitution, the Framers encouraged the 
creation of works “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”30  Historically, the Copyright Act of 1909 granted copyright 
protection to “all writings” within an initial period of 28 years.31  All 
works subject to the 1909 Copyright Act “had to be published with 
notice or a deposit had to be made in the Copyright Office.”32  The 
failure to fulfill these requirements resulted in a forfeiture of protection 
 
29 For a proposed rule that would apply equally to musical compositions and sound 
recordings, see Part V.D. 
30 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
31 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 
2018, at 495 (2018).  After the initial period of 28 years ended, the work could be renewed for 
another 28 years.  Id. 
32 Hutchens, supra note 11; See generally Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 
35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (stating the relevant language for the entire 1909 Act). 
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of the work.33  For musical compositions, “the work had to be reduced 
to sheet music or other manuscript form” in order to satisfy “the notice 
and deposit requirements” to obtain copyright protection.34  Thus, the 
scope of copyright protection began with the date of publication of a 
work under the 1909 Act.35 
Subsequently, the Copyright Act of 1976 “expanded both the 
scope and duration of protection.”36  The 1976 Act relaxed the notice 
and registration requirements37 and extended the length of copyright 
protection “to the life of the author plus 50 years.”38  Compared to the 
1909 Act, copyright protection under the 1976 Act is secured “in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,”39 meaning that these works have copyright protection 
even if they are not published.40  The 1976 Act further expanded 
copyright protection to include both “musical works”41 and “sound 
 
33 MENELL ET AL., supra note 31. 
34 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.05[A] (2018). 
35 MENELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 521. 
36 Id. at 495. 
37 See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888, 892 
(2019) (holding that under the registration approach, a copyrighted work is registered, and the 
copyright holder can initiate an infringement suit, only after the Copyright Office examined 
the copyright application and registered the work). 
38 MENELL ET AL., supra note 31.  The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 
extended this term by another 20 years, giving copyright protection for the author’s life plus 
70 years.  Id. at 613-14.  However, “if anonymous works, pseudonymous works, or works 
made for hire, [the term is] 95 years from publication, or 120 years from creation, whichever 
is less.”  Id. at 614.  A pseudonymous work is defined as “a work on the copies or phonorecords 
of which the author is identified under a fictitious name.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).  An 
anonymous work is defined as “a work on the copies or phonorecords of which no natural 
person is identified as author.”  Id.  A work made for hire is defined as “(1) a work prepared 
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,” or it may be “(2) a work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work . . . if the parties 
expressly agree . . . that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”  Id. 
39 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  For the fixation requirement, “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible 
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the 
authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”  Id.  § 
101.   
40 MENELL ET AL., supra note 31. 
41 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). 
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recordings,”42 among other categories of copyrightable works.43  There 
is copyright protection in the “music, lyrics, and arrangements” of a 
musical work that are fixed in some “tangible medium of expression,” 
such as “written on paper” or “pressed onto a phonorecord.”44  For 
sound recordings, there is copyright protection in “the fixation of a 
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds” in the recorded version of 
a work.45  Thus, with the rise of technological advancements during 
the twentieth century “for creating and distributing works of 
authorship,” a significant change in copyright law from the 1909 Act 
to the 1976 Act was allowing copyright protection beginning with 
fixation rather than publication of the work.46 
B.  Originality and Creativity 
To succeed on a claim of copyright infringement, it is 
necessary to show “ownership of a valid copyright” and the “copying 
of constituent elements of the work that are original.”47  Generally, any 
work subject to copyright protection must contain original expression 
and creativity.48  For a work to be original, the author must show it  
was “independently created rather than copied from other works.”49  A 
work may be original even if it closely resembles another work because 
only independent creation, not novelty, is required.50  In fact, “the 
requisite level of creativity is extremely low” for a work to be 
considered original.51  There only needs to be a “minimal level of 
 
42 Id. § 102(a)(7).  Sound recordings are defined as “works that result from the fixation of 
a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such 
as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”  Id. § 101.   
43 See id. § 102 (identifying the eight categories of works that are subject to copyright 
protection). 
44 MENELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 532-33.  For a definition of fixation, see supra note 39. 
45 17 U.S.C. § 101.   
46 MENELL ET AL., supra note 31. 
47 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).  It is important to 
note that these elements to succeed on a claim of copyright infringement are applied to claims 
under both the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act.   
48 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 2.05[B]. 
49 Id. § 2.01[A][1] (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345). 
50 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; NIMMER, supra note 34, § 2.05[A]. 
51 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.  
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creativity,”52 which is represented by “a spark of distinctiveness 
in copyrightable expression.”53   
For musical works, originality is evident by the composer’s 
own effort and contribution to the song.54  In popular music, it is 
common for songs to have similarities to prior songs, so “only 
independent effort, not novelty” is required for a work to be original.55  
Likewise, creativity is represented by the musician’s use “of rhythm, 
harmony, and melody.”56  However, the melody of a song is the most 
common source for copyright protection.57  While “a musical theme 
may be suggestive of prior works,” a work will be creative as long as 
“the overall impression is of a new work.”58   
C. Access and Substantial Similarity 
In music copyright infringement cases, it is often difficult to 
obtain direct evidence of copying.59  In these situations, “a plaintiff 
may prove copying indirectly, with evidence showing that the 
defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the purported 
copy is ‘substantially similar’ to the original.”60  Under the inverse 
ratio rule, which serves as a sliding scale, the courts “require a lower 
standard of proof on substantial similarity when a high degree of access 
is shown.”61  To prove access to a musical work, the plaintiff may 
“show that its work was widely disseminated through sales of sheet 
 
52 Id. at 358. 
53 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 2.01[B][2]. 




58 Id. (citing Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 
1952)). 
59 Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Three Boys Music Corp. 
v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Proof of copyright infringement is often highly 
circumstantial, particularly in cases involving music.”). 
60 Copeland, 789 F.3d at 488. 
61 Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 
1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1990); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977)).  For the inverse ratio rule, “if there are no 
similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying.  If there is evidence 
of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the 
similarities are sufficient to prove copying.”  Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 
1946). 
8
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music, records, and radio performances.”62  Thus, the initial step of 
determining whether access has been satisfied is crucial because even 
if two songs are very similar, a suit of copyright infringement will not 
succeed if there is no proof of access.63 
While each circuit uses its own modified tests for substantial 
similarity, the different circuits generally take a two-step approach.64  
To determine substantial similarity, the Ninth Circuit utilizes a two-
part test that includes “an objective extrinsic test and a subjective 
intrinsic test.”65  Typically, the Ninth Circuit requires that both the 
extrinsic and intrinsic tests are satisfied to succeed on a claim of music 
copyright infringement.66  However, this test is modified when the 
court grants a motion for summary judgment for either the plaintiff or 
defendant, as “only the extrinsic test is important because the 
subjective question whether works are intrinsically similar must be left 
to the jury.”67  When applying the extrinsic test, “analytic dissection 
and expert testimony” are admissible in order to analyze objective 
criteria in the musical works.68  After the plaintiff establishes that the 
two songs are “sufficiently similar” under the extrinsic test, the court 
must proceed to the intrinsic test in order to examine whether the works 
 
62 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482 (quoting 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, 
LAW, AND PRACTICE § 8.3.1.1, at 91 (1989)). 
63 Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1984). 
64 See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 
(2018) (explaining the various tests used by the different circuits for substantial similarity).   
65 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).  Several circuit courts utilize 
different tests for establishing copyright infringement, while other circuits use variations of 
the Ninth Circuit test.  For the Second Circuit, two elements must be established: “(a) that 
defendant copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to 
be proved) went to [sic] far as to constitute improper appropriation.”  Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 
468.  For the Sixth Circuit, this circuit uses a similar two-step test like the Ninth Circuit, but 
there are differences between the tests in both circuits.  Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 
F.3d 283, 294 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
66 Miah Rosenberg, Do You Hear What I Hear? Expert Testimony in Music Infringement 
Cases in the Ninth Circuit, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1669, 1676 (2006).   
67 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845; see Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 1673 (“Under the extrinsic 
portion, if the plaintiff, the copyright holder, fails to show sufficient similarity between her 
song and the defendant’s song, the court will grant the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.”); see also Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1330 
(9th Cir. 1983) (“A grant of summary judgment for plaintiff is proper where works are so 
overwhelmingly identical that the possibility of independent creation is precluded.  Similarly, 
summary judgment for defendant is appropriate where works are so dissimilar that a claim of 
infringement is without merit.” (internal citations omitted)). 
68 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
9
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are substantially similar.69  The intrinsic test will only be reached if the 
plaintiff adequately demonstrated that the two works were similar 
under the extrinsic test,70 along with instances when a motion for 
summary judgment was denied.  In the subjective intrinsic test, the jury 
is presented with “whether the ordinary, reasonable person would find 
the total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”71  
Unlike the extrinsic test, “analytic dissection and expert testimony” are 
not admissible under the intrinsic test.72   
III. MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES 
To underscore the intricate and novel issue presented in 
Williams v. Gaye, a brief application of copyright law in past music 
copyright infringement cases will be examined.  First, this section will 
discuss cases in which musicians copied from other musicians and will 
further describe what the plaintiff needed to prove to establish copying.  
Second, this section will discuss how these cases applied the test for 
substantial similarity. 
In some instances, a plaintiff may make a blatant and direct 
showing of copyright infringement.73  For example, in the song “Ice 
Ice Baby,” Vanilla Ice sampled and copied the bass line in the Queen 
and David Bowie song “Under Pressure” without asking for 
permission, resulting in a clear case of copyright infringement.74  
However, absence of deliberate copying of another musical work does 
not prevent liability for copyright infringement.75  Specifically, in 
George Harrison’s solo song “My Sweet Lord,” he was found to have 
subconsciously76 plagiarized the “pleasing combination of sounds” of 
 
69 Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 1673-74. 
70 Id. at 1676. 
71 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pasillas 
v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
72 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
73 See Joe Lynch, 8 Songs Accused of Plagiarism That Hit No. 1 on the Billboard Hot 
100, BILLBOARD (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/list/6501950/song 
s-accused-plagiarism-no-1-hot-100-blurred-lines (explaining that many hit songs sound very 
similar to previously released songs due to theft or coincidence). 
74 Jordan Runtagh, Songs on Trial: 12 Landmark Music Copyright Cases, ROLLING STONE 
(June 8, 2016, 4:24 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-lists/songs-on-trial-
12-landmark-music-copyright-cases-166396/george-harrison-vs-the-chiffons-1976-64089/. 
75 Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976). 
76 For a definition of subconscious plagiarism, see infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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“He’s So Fine” by The Chiffons.77  Subconscious plagiarism occurs 
when a musician uses a “combination of sounds” that he believes will 
be pleasing to listeners “[b]ecause his subconscious knew it already 
had worked in a song his conscious mind did not remember.”78  In this 
case, Harrison had access to “He’s So Fine” because this song was at 
the top of the charts in both the United States and England.79  In “My 
Sweet Lord,” Harrison used the same musical motif patterns as in 
“He’s So Fine” to fit the words of his song, and he also used identical 
harmonies.80  However, the district court recognized that Harrison and 
his group member, Billy Preston, were not “conscious of the fact that 
they were utilizing the He’s So Fine theme.”81  Although Harrison may 
not have deliberately copied the elements of “He’s So Fine,” the 
district court held that Harrison was liable for copyright infringement 
because both songs were “virtually identical” and he had access to the 
song.82  Subsequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision of copyright infringement, explaining “that copyright 
infringement can be subconscious.”83   
Additionally, in Selle v. Gibb,84 Ronald Selle brought a 
copyright infringement suit against the Bee Gees arguing that their hit 
song “How Deep Is Your Love” copied his song “Let it End.”85  At 
trial, the plaintiff’s expert witness testified that there were “striking 
similarities” between the songs, specifically in the Bee Gees’ use of 
identical “rhythmic impulses” and notes from Selle’s song.86  Although 
the jury found in favor of Selle, the judge granted the Bee Gees’ motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Selle failed to show 
that the Bee Gees had access to his song.87  In fact, the Bee Gees 
introduced a work tape at trial showcasing their creative process of 
composing “How Deep is Your Love.”88  Thus, “a bare possibility” or 
 
77 Bright Tunes Music, 420 F. Supp. at 180.   
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 179. 
80 Id. at 178. 
81 Id. at 180. 
82 Id. at 180-81; see Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1171 n.16 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining 
that the factfinders listened to the sound recordings in several cases evaluated under the 1909). 
83 ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983). 
84 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). 
85 Id. at 898. 
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the “inability to raise more than speculation” of access to a song is 
insufficient to prevail on a copyright infringement claim even if there 
is a striking similarity between songs.89 
In Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton,90 the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed a jury verdict finding Michael Bolton’s 1991 song “Love Is a 
Wonderful Thing” infringed the Isley Brothers’ 1964 hit with the same 
name.91  Evidence of access was provided and the jury found that 
Bolton was not only a fan and collector of the Isley Brothers’ music, 
but he also had access to the 1964 hit on both the radio and television.92  
The Isley Brothers maintained that Bolton’s widespread access to 
“Love Is a Wonderful Thing” resulted in his subconscious copying of 
their song.93  The court reasoned that it was plausible to presume that 
Bolton subconsciously copied the Isley Brothers’ song.94  Specifically, 
as Bolton was “obsessed with rhythm and blues music,” it is possible 
that he would subconsciously remember this Isley Brothers’ song that 
was repeatedly played when he was a teenager.95  Further, on the 
recorded sessions of “Love Is a Wonderful Thing,” Bolton questioned 
whether he was copying Marvin Gaye’s song “Some Kind of 
Wonderful.”96  Although he mistakenly believed that he copied Gaye, 
the court reasoned that this statement suggested “that Bolton believed 
he may have been copying someone else’s song.”97 
Next, the jury found infringement based on the substantial 
similarity of five unprotectable musical elements.98  These elements 
included “the lyric, rhythm, and pitch” of “the title hook phrase,” “the 
shifted cadence,” “the instrumental figures,” “the verse/chord 
relationship,” and “the fade ending.”99  The court explained that while 
these elements were individually unprotectable, the court will not 
disturb the jury’s determination of substantial similarity because the 
 
89 Id. at 903, 905. 
90 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000). 
91 Id. at 480. 
92 Id. at 483. 
93 Id.  For a definition of subconscious plagiarism, see supra note 78 and accompanying 
text. 




98 Id. at 485; see Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that courts 
have considered different elements of a musical composition when determining substantial 
similarity). 
99 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485. 
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combination of elements was very similar.100  In fact, Bolton’s expert 
musicologist acknowledged that these musical elements between the 
two songs were similar.101  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit applied 
judicial deference to the jury’s verdict in finding a case of copyright 
infringement.102 
As identified in these cases, the courts do not apply a fixed set 
of objective elements to compare two songs, and the courts may 
examine a combination of unprotectable elements.103  Specifically, 
“[m]usic, like software programs and art objects, is not capable of 
ready classification into only five or six constituent elements; music is 
comprised of a large array of elements, some combination of which is 
protectable by copyright.”104  Typically, courts consider specific 
musical elements, such as “melody, harmony, rhythm, pitch, tempo, 
phrasing, structure, chord progressions, and lyrics.”105  However, these 
elements often need to be considered in combination with other 
musical elements to determine whether the works are substantially 
similar.106  For instance, while a chord progression may not be a 
protectable element on its own, two works may be substantially similar 
when examining the chord progression in combination with the rhythm 
and pitch patterns.107  An analysis of individual musical elements in 
isolation will most likely result in “an incomplete and distorted 
musicological analysis.”108  Nevertheless, while a combination of 
unprotectable musical elements may result in copyright protection for 
 
100 Id. at 485-86.  The majority opinion in Williams v. Gaye explained that as in Three Boys 
Music, the court will apply deference to the jury’s verdict.  Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 
1172 n.17 (9th Cir. 2018).  In a way, Three Boys Music is the forerunner of Williams because 
the court applied similar reasoning when giving full deference to the jury’s determination of 
substantial similarity. 
101 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485. 
102 Id. at 482.  It is important to note that the court expressed that it may not have reached 
the same conclusion as the jury on the issue of access and subconscious copying.  However, 
the court “will not disturb the jury’s factual and credibility determinations on the issue.”  Id. 
at 485. 
103 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 849. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  “In addition, commentators have opined that timbre, tone, spatial organization, 
consonance, dissonance, accents, note choice, combinations, interplay of instruments, 
basslines, and new technological sounds can all be elements of a musical composition.”  Id. 
106 Id. at 848. 
107 Id.; see Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Each note in a scale, 
for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of notes in a tune may earn copyright 
protection.”). 
108 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848. 
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a song, the courts should closely consider the originality of these 
individual elements within a song before finding substantially 
similarity.109 
There are several ways that copyright infringement may occur 
in music copyright lawsuits.  In some instances, the plaintiff can show 
that the defendant copied parts of his or her song.110  Even if direct 
copying is not proven, the court may consider whether an artist 
subconsciously plagiarized another musician’s work.111  However, it is 
more common that the plaintiff will have to show that both songs are 
substantially similar.  These cases showed that the courts will examine 
whether the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work in determining 
substantial similarity.  Under the extrinsic test, the plaintiff must show 
that both songs contain a sufficient degree of similar elements.  Then, 
the jury will apply the intrinsic test to evaluate whether a reasonable 
listener would find both songs to be similar.  The music copyright 
infringement cases discussed in this section serve as a guide for the 
analysis of Williams v. Gaye in the subsequent section. 
IV. BACKGROUND OF WILLIAMS V. GAYE 
Initially, Williams and Thicke preemptively filed suit for a 
declaratory judgment in reaction to the Gayes’ allegations that 
“Blurred Lines” infringed “Got to Give It Up” and the Gayes’ demands 
for monetary compensation.112  The Gaye family then counterclaimed 
for copyright infringement of Gaye’s song.113  Subsequently, the 
district court denied the motion for summary judgment brought by 
Williams and Thicke.114  To determine whether the songs were 
substantially similar, the jury heavily relied on the expert testimony 
presented by both parties.115 
 
109 See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] combination of 
unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous 
enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes 
an original work of authorship.”). 
110 For a brief example of direct copying, see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
112 Hutchens, supra note 11. 
113 Id. 
114 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 
7877773, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 
115 Post, supra note 14. 
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A. Substantial Similarity and Access in Williams v. 
Gaye   
Judith Finell, the expert musicologist for the Gaye family, 
identified eight similarities between “Blurred Lines” and “Got to Give 
It Up.”116  These elements include the “signature phrase in main vocal 
melodies,” the “hooks,” the “hooks with backup vocals,” the “core 
theme,” or “Theme X” of the song, the “backup hooks,” the “bass 
melodies,” the “keyboard parts,” and the “unusual percussion 
choices.”117  For the signature phrase, Finell identified the phrase with 
the lyrics “and that’s why I’m gon’ take a good girl” in “Blurred Lines” 
and with the lyrics “I used to go out to parties” in “Got to Give It 
Up.”118  Finell argued that both signature phrases repeat the starting 
note, “contain the identical scale degree sequence of 5–6–1 followed 
by 1–5,” “contain identical rhythms for the first six tones,” use a 
melisma119 on the last lyric, and “contain substantially similar melodic 
contours.”120  In comparison, Sandy Wilbur, the musicologist for the 
Thicke Parties, stated that she did not find any substantial similarity 
between the songs, given that “the melody, harmony, and rhythm of 
the songs are different.”121  Instead, Wilbur only found one single note 
with “the same pitch and placement” within both signature phrases.122 
Next, Finell maintained that “three of the four notes of the 
songs’ hooks are identical in scale degree”; however, Wilbur argued 
that Finell inaccurately spaced the hook within the measure of each 
song.123  For the opening bass line, Finell found that the repeated bass 
line in bars 1–4 of “Blurred Lines” is similar to the opening bass line 
in measures 1–4 of Gaye’s song.124  However, Wilbur disputed this 
finding, arguing “that the differences between the bass lines outweigh 
the similarities” because only three notes are similar within these four 
measures.125  Further, Finell claimed that the descending bass line at 
 
116 Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *3. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at *12. 
119 Melisma is defined as “an ornamental phrase of several notes sung to one syllable of 
text, as in plainsong or blues singing.”  Melisma, DICTIONARY.COM, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/melisma?s=t (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
120 Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *12. 
121 Id. at *13. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at *14. 
124 Id. at *15. 
125 Id. 
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every eighth measure in “Blurred Lines” is similar to an irregularly 
occurring bass melody in “Got to Give It Up.”126  Additionally, while 
Finell maintained that the keyboard parts in “Blurred Lines” and “Got 
to Give It Up” are similar, Wilbur argued that the “rhythm transcribed 
by Finell does not appear in the copyright deposit,” indicating that only 
the similarity in pitches can be analyzed.127 
In music copyright infringement cases, the courts consistently 
focus on the melodies of two different songs in determining whether 
songs are substantially similar under copyright law.128  The melodic 
line of a song includes particular pitches, the duration and placement 
of these pitches, and rhythmic patterns.129  In finding similarities 
between the bass melodies and rhythmic patterns as described above, 
Finell essentially made comparisons of the melodies that “distorted the 
duration and placement of notes in their presentation.”130  Thus, in 
isolating individual sequences of pitches, Finell conducted “overly 
speculative musical analyses.”131 
In evaluating Thicke’s access to Gaye’s song, the district court 
examined interviews and deposition testimony demonstrating that 
Thicke was influenced by Gaye and “Got to Give It Up” when creating 
“Blurred Lines.”132  In fact, Thicke told one magazine that he wanted 
to create a groove similar to Gaye’s song in “Got To Give It Up.”133  
Because the Thicke Parties’ motion for summary judgment was denied 
due to the material issues of fact for the extrinsic elements of the songs, 
the case was presented to the jury in order to evaluate the songs’ 
intrinsic similarities.134  Subsequently, a jury was empaneled on 
February 24, 2015 to evaluate the substantial similarity between the 
songs.135  During the trial, which lasted seven days, the jurors listened 
to expert testimony from both sides and were presented with a 
 
126 Id. at *16. 
127 Id. 
128 Brief of Amicus Curiae Musicologists in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Appellees at 2, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (CA No. 15-56880). 
129 Id. at 5. 
130 Id. at 2. 
131 Id. at 5. 
132 Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *10. 
133 Id. at *11. 
134 Id. at *20; Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “only 
the extrinsic test” for substantial similarity is relevant for considering motions of summary 
judgment). 
135 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015). 
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comparison of the deposit copy of “Got to Give It Up” with “Blurred 
Lines.”136  After two days of deliberating on the testimony presented 
at trial, the jury found the Thicke Parties liable for copyright 
infringement of Gaye’s song.137 
B. The Ninth Circuit Appeal 
On appeal, the Thicke Parties argued that the district court’s 
denial of their summary judgment motion was erroneous “in its 
application of the extrinsic test for substantial similarity.”138  However, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ortiz v. Jordan,139 which held that a party may not appeal 
a denial of a summary judgment motion after a full trial on the 
merits.140  Despite the exception to the rule when there is an error of 
law, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the exception did not apply in this 
case because “the district court’s application of the extrinsic test of 
similarity was a factbound inquiry.”141 
Next, the Thicke Parties moved for a new trial because there 
were erroneous jury instructions, the district court improperly admitted 
portions of the Gayes’ expert testimony, and “the verdict [was] against 
the clear weight of the evidence.”142  First, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Jury Instructions 42 and 43 were not erroneous.143  In Jury Instruction 
42, the jurors were told that they did not have to “find that the Thicke 
Parties consciously or deliberately copied” Gaye’s song.144  Instead, 
the instruction indicated that a finding of subconscious copying by the 
Thicke Parties was sufficient in order to determine that “Got to Give It 
 
136 Id.; Regina Zernay, Casting the First Stone: The Future of Music Copyright 
Infringement Law After Blurred Lines, Stay with Me, and Uptown Funk, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 
177, 207 (2017). 
137 Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *1. 
138 Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1166 (9th Cir. 2018). 
139 562 U.S. 180 (2011). 
140 Id. at 184. 
141 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1166. 
142 Id. at 1167; see Eriq Gardner, Appeals Court Skeptical About Overturning Marvin Gaye 
Family’s “Blurred Lines” Victory, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 6, 2017, 12:49 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/appeals-court-skeptical-overturning-marvin-
gaye-familys-blurred-lines-victory-1046549 (“The appellants are contending that 
Judge Kronstadt committed reversible error a few different ways.”). 
143 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1168, 1170. 
144 Id. at 1167. 
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Up” was copied.145  In opposition to Jury Instruction 42, the Thicke 
Parties argued that this instruction improperly gave the jury the 
opportunity “to place undue weight” on their statements 
acknowledging their inspiration and access to “Got to Give It Up.”146  
Although the Thicke Parties did admit their access to Gaye’s song, the 
court pointed to the relevancy of access in this particular instruction.147  
Specifically, the court applied the inverse ratio rule, which acts like a 
sliding scale for substantial similarity and access.148  Under this rule, 
“[t]he greater the showing of access, the lesser the showing of 
substantial similarity is required.”149  Thus, the court held that 
Instruction 42 was applicable because Thicke’s statements indicating 
his access to Gaye’s song resulted in requiring a lesser showing of 
infringement in the substantial similarity stage.150   
Additionally, Jury Instruction 43 instructed the jury that the 
Gaye Parties must demonstrate both extrinsic and intrinsic similarities 
between the songs in order to prove that the works are substantially 
similar.151  First, the jury was told that two works are extrinsically 
similar when there is “a similarity of ideas and expression as measured 
by external, objective criteria.”152  Second, the jury was told that there 
is intrinsic similarity between the works “if an ordinary, reasonable 
listener would conclude that the total concept and feel of the Gaye 
Parties’ work and the Thicke Parties’ work are substantially 
similar.”153  The Thicke Parties argued that the district court 
improperly instructed the jury to evaluate musical elements that are not 
protected elements in the deposit copy, specifically “‘Theme X,’ the 
 
145 Id.  In Three Boys Music, the jury found that Bolton subconsciously plagiarized the Isley 
Brothers’ song based on his access to their song while growing up.  Although the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the jury’s findings, the court expressed that it did not agree with this conclusion 
regarding subconscious plagiarism and access.  Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 
477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).  In this way, the Ninth Circuit in Williams went a step further than 
Three Boys Music by stating in the jury instruction that subconscious plagiarism was sufficient 
to find copying. 
146 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1167. 
147 Id. at 1168. 
148 Id. at 1163. 
149 Id.; see Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485; see also Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 
844-45 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that since Carey had a high amount of access to Swirsky’s 
song, the burden of proving substantial similarity is lessened). 
150 Id. at 1168. 
151 Jury Instructions No. 43 at 46, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 
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descending bass line, and keyboard parts.”154  The Thicke Parties 
asserted that the instruction was erroneous because the jury was told 
that it “must consider” musical elements that they believe to be 
unprotectable in order to evaluate substantial similarity.155  However, 
the court downplayed these words to underscore the jury’s role in 
evaluating the objective elements in the extrinsic test for substantial 
similarity.156 
Second, the Thicke Parties argued that the Gayes’ expert 
testimony was based on unprotectable musical elements of Gaye’s 
song, specifically “‘Theme X,’ the descending bass line, and the 
keyboard parts.”157  While Finell admitted on cross-examination that 
features of these elements were not written in the deposit copy, the 
Ninth Circuit gave the jury the role of determining whose expert 
testimony concerning the deposit copy was believable.158  In addition, 
the Thicke Parties claimed that allowing the jury to hear the audio 
“mash-ups” overlapping Gaye’s vocals with “Blurred Lines” in Dr. 
Ingrid Monson’s testimony was erroneous because it included 
unprotectable musical elements.159  However, the Ninth Circuit held 
that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
portions of the Gayes’ experts’ testimony,” reasoning that it repeatedly 
 
154 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1168.  In this case, the Thicke Parties argued that several musical 
elements used in the court’s analysis were unprotectable because they were not notated in the 
deposit copy.  Id.  For a discussion of protectable and unprotectable musical elements, see 
supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.  Typically, these musical elements are not 
protectable because individual notes or single chords are critical for the foundation of a 
musical work.  For example, a descending bass line is not protectable because there is no 
creative organization of notes when playing a descending melodic line.  For the same reason, 
a single pitch on the keyboard cannot be individually protectable.   
155 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1168.  While the jury in Three Boys Music also analyzed a 
combination of unprotectable musical elements, that case did not use this language that the 
jury “must consider” the unprotectable elements. 
156 Id. at 1169. 
157 Id. at 1170. 
158 Id.  In Three Boys Music, the jury was also presented with conflicting testimony from 
expert musicologists in determining whether there was infringement.  The court was unwilling 
“to interfere with the jury’s credibility determination” for its evaluation of substantial 
similarity.  Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).  “Because 
the jury needs to be educated, the musicologist would appear to play a necessary part in the 
proceedings.”  Maureen Baker, La[w]—A Note To Follow So: Have We Forgotten the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in Music Plagiarism Cases?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1583, 1619 (1992). 
159 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1170 (explaining that the “mash-ups” contained “the keyboard 
parts, bass melodies, and Marvin Gaye’s vocals,” which are unprotectable elements). 
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made sure that the experts only discussed the sheet music in their 
testimony.160 
Third, the Ninth Circuit dispelled the claim that the jury verdict 
was “against the clear weight of the evidence” because there was no 
“absolute absence of evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.”161  
Specifically, the court relied on its deferential standard of review and 
its reluctance in music copyright infringement cases to reverse the 
jury’s findings on appeal, mainly due to the difficulties in showing 
substantial similarity and access.162  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held “that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Thicke 
Parties’ motion for a new trial.”163 
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen cautioned 
that the majority opinion allowed “the Gayes to accomplish what no 
one has before: copyright a musical style.”164  She emphasized that the 
two songs “are not objectively similar” because there are clear 
differences in the “melody, harmony, and rhythm.”165  Judge Nguyen 
argued that Judith Finell, the Gayes’ musicologist, “cherry-picked 
brief snippets to opine that a ‘constellation’ of individually 
unprotectable elements in both pieces of music made them 
substantially similar.”166  Judge Nguyen recognized the importance of 
expert testimony “to assist jurors who are unfamiliar with musical 
notation in comparing two pieces of sheet music for extrinsic similarity 
in the same way that they would compare two textual works.”167  
However, she explained that the experts must present facts that are 
logically related to their conclusions, and Finell failed to do this by 
choosing to compare isolated and unprotectable elements.168  Based on 
the lack of extrinsic similarities between both songs, Judge Nguyen 
reasoned that the Thicke Parties should have been “entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”169 
Likewise, Judge Nguyen argued that “by refusing to compare 
the two works, the majority establishes a dangerous precedent that 
 
160 Id. at 1171. 
161 Id. at 1171-72. 
162 Id. at 1172 (citing Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 481). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 1183 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
167 Id. at 1196-97 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 1183 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. at 1184 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
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strikes a devastating blow to future musicians and composers 
everywhere.”170  The majority dismissed and rebutted Judge Nguyen’s 
fears on the future of musical creativity as “unfounded hyperbole.”171  
Also, the majority declared that its decision does not give copyright 
protection for the groove or style of a song, reiterating that this decision 
rested “on settled procedural principles and the limited nature” of the 
court’s appellate review.172  However, Judge Nguyen cautioned against 
the “uncritical deference to music experts,” emphasizing that judges 
must determine whether the musical elements are substantially similar 
based on the law.173  Thus, the Ninth Circuit should have vacated this 
verdict because the musical elements were not substantially similar.174  
Notwithstanding the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion more 
accurately depicts the similarities, or rather the lack of similarities, 
between both songs.  The subsequent section of this Note will illustrate 
the flawed errors in this decision and the negative implications on 
musical creativity. 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WILLIAMS V. GAYE ON MUSICAL 
CREATIVITY 
A. The Major Errors in the Ninth Circuit’s Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision improperly expanded the scope of 
copyright protection to the feel or groove of a song.175  In the dissenting 
opinion, Judge Nguyen adamantly disagreed with the majority’s 
decision by emphasizing that the two songs do not have similar 
musical elements.176  The majority opinion, on the other hand, declared 
that unlike the limited protections under the 1909 Act in this case, most 
cases in the future will come under the 1976 Act, providing protections 
for works in sound recordings.177  Hypothetically, if this case had been 
 
170 Id. at 1183 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
171 Id. at 1182. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1197 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
174 Id. (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
175 See Wu, supra note 17 (“The question is not whether Pharrell borrowed from Gaye but 
whether Gaye owned the thing that was borrowed.  And this is where the case falls apart.  For 
it was not any actual sequence of notes that Pharrell borrowed, but rather the general style of 
Gaye’s songs.  That is why ‘Blurred Lines’ sounds very much like a Marvin Gaye song.”). 
176 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1183 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 1182 n.27 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102).  For a discussion of the scope of protection 
under the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act, see Part II.A. of this Note. 
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decided under the formalities of the 1976 Act, it is possible that the 
Gaye Parties may have prevailed on a claim for substantial 
similarity.178  That is, the 1976 Act affords broader copyright 
protection to the recorded versions of the songs, allowing protections 
for an artist’s sonic choices, namely with the use of a cowbell and 
falsetto vocals in this case.179  However, as this case falls under the 
1909 Act, the Gaye Parties should not have prevailed because 
Williams did not copy or “borrow any note sequences” from Gaye’s 
musical composition.180   
Moreover, even if the protections for the sound recordings 
under the Copyright Act of 1976 applied in this case, that does not 
change the fact that the groove or style of a musical genre “is an 
unprotectable idea.”181  Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School 
emphasized the distinction between taking specific musical patterns 
from another artist and simply sounding like another style.182  He 
stated, “to say that something ‘sounds like’ something else does not 
amount to copyright infringement.”183  Thus, while “Blurred Lines” 
and “Got to Give It Up” have an overall similar feel, the protection of 
the groove is inappropriate, especially because the protectable melody 
and lyrics are completely different.184 
Kathleen Sullivan, who represented Williams and Thicke, 
persuasively argued that this case is not about a comparison between 
the similarities in the sound recording, groove, or inspiration between 
“Blurred Lines” and “Got to Give It Up.”185  Instead, she emphasized 
that this case is about the substantial similarities of the musical 
elements in the deposit copies of both songs, including “the melody, 
 
178 See Wu, supra note 17. 
179 Id.  For a comparison of the protection of sound recordings and musical compositions 
under the 1976 Act, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
180 Id. 
181 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1185 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
182 Wu, supra note 17. 
183 Id. 
184 Post, supra note 14.  For a discussion on the consequences of protecting the groove or 
style of a musical composition or sound recording, see Part V.C. 
185 Oral Argument at 1:22, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (2018) (No. 15-56880), 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000012297.  While this case 
was about the deposit copies of the songs, it is important to recognize that a mere similarity in 
the groove or inspiration of a song will not result in copyright infringement in the sound 
recording.  For an explanation on the inability to copyright a groove, see infra notes 236-244 
and accompanying text. 
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lyrics, harmony, chords, [and] instrumentation.”186  Sullivan argued 
that the instructions did not correctly advise the jury on the test for 
substantial similarity because the instructions should have informed 
the jury that it needed to determine whether there were substantial 
similarities between only the protectable musical elements in the 
deposit copies of the songs, not the unprotectable elements as well.187  
Instead, Jury Instruction 43 instructed the jury that it “must consider” 
the musical elements of both songs, thereby failing to advise the jury 
to only examine the similarity between the protectable musical 
elements.188  This instruction even listed unprotectable musical 
elements for the jury to consider that were not in the deposit copy.189  
Because Finell admitted that “Theme X,” the keyboard parts, and “the 
descending bass line” were not notated in the deposit copy, Sullivan 
expressed to the panel that Jury Instruction 43 should not have 
instructed the jury to examine these elements.190   
Additionally, Sullivan emphasized that the Gaye Parties had to 
prove that the songs were substantially similar based on the protectable 
musical elements in the written deposit copies because the sound 
recordings contain unprotectable elements.191  However, she 
emphasized that the district court’s exclusion of the sound recording 
was insufficient because it was introduced through the “mash-ups” of 
Gaye’s vocals.192  Next, Sullivan acknowledged that the Gaye Parties 
did have copyright protection in the melody, chords, instrumentation, 
and lyrics in the deposit copy of “Got to Give It Up.”193  Nevertheless, 
she argued that Gayes’ musicology experts essentially embellished and 
altered the deposit copy, which is “a travesty” because elements cannot 
be made up if they are not present in the lead sheet.194   
In Three Boys Music, the jury’s reliance on unprotectable 
musical elements is essential for analyzing the musical elements in 
Williams, as Three Boys Music is the prevailing Ninth Circuit case on 
 
186 Id. at 1:34. 
187 Id. at 3:44. 
188 Id. at 58:40. 
189 Id. at 14:20. 
190 Id. at 16:00. 
191 Id. at 56:31. 
192 Id. at 56:44. 
193 Id. at 57:33. 
194 Id. at 57:45.  Throughout the oral argument, Sullivan referred to the deposit copy as the 
“lead sheet.”  The lead sheet is another way of describing the fundamental musical elements 
and structure of a song that is written on the sheet music.  
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this issue.195  In both cases, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to overturn 
the jury’s findings that there was substantial similarity in the 
unprotectable musical elements.196  In Three Boys Music, the deposit 
copy contained “the song’s essential elements such as the title hook, 
chorus, and pitches.”197  The jury in that case found that the 
combination of unprotectable elements was so similar that the songs 
were substantially similar.198  In fact, a combination of unprotectable 
elements may accurately result in a finding of copyright 
infringement.199  However, compared to Three Boys Music, this Ninth 
Circuit decision wrongly allowed the Gayes’ “musicologists to draw 
inferences beyond what was expressed in the sheet music.”200  
Moreover, Three Boys Music does not involve a comparison of the 
groove or feel of the songs, further distinguishing these cases.  Thus, 
by finding similarities in the “unprotectable elements like the ‘groove’ 
on Marvin Gaye’s hit,”201 the jury’s reliance on these unprotectable 
elements was entirely improper.   
B. The Role of the Jury in Music Copyright 
Infringement Cases 
Sullivan’s arguments are critical in examining how the court 
should have presented the evidence to the jury in this music copyright 
infringement case.  During the oral argument, Sullivan explained that 
“the sound recording is not properly evidence of the” musical elements 
in the sheet music.202  Also, she argued that the district court should 
not have admitted elements from the sound recordings through the 
Gayes’ expert testimony and “mash-ups” because the protectable 
elements were only within the lead sheet.203  Judge Nguyen responded 
to Sullivan’s arguments by recognizing that the sound recordings may 
contain unprotectable musical elements that “may unduly sway the 
jurors.”204  This point is supported by the fact that juries do not 
 
195 For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 90-102. 
196 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
197 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000). 
198 Id. at 485. 
199 See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
200 Gardner, supra note 142. 
201 Id. 
202 Oral Argument, supra note 185, at 55:50. 
203 Id. at 56:29.   
204 Id. at 55:59. 
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customarily hear only portions of songs instead of hearing the 
complete versions of the songs.205  Thus, if the jury determined that 
“Blurred Lines” and “Got to Give It Up” were similar based on 
unprotectable elements, such as the feel and musical genre, this 
decision was erroneous.206 
The tenuous role of the jury in music copyright infringement 
cases was represented in a mock trial of this case by Professor Jennifer 
Jenkins from Duke Law School. 207  As a professor of Music Copyright, 
Professor Jenkins discussed “the detailed legal and musicological 
arguments” with her class.208  As this mock trial was conducted before 
the actual jury’s verdict, Professor Jenkins asked her students which 
party should win this case “based on the law.”209  In a unanimous 
decision, the students believed that the Thicke Parties should 
prevail.210  Professor Jenkins stated that copyright infringement occurs 
when a musician copies a substantial degree of protectable elements 
from another musician.211  In this case, she explained that an analysis 
of the protectable musical elements “was limited to the music and 
lyrics” notated in the deposit copy of “Got to Give It Up.”212  Upon 
examination of both compositions, the notated musical elements that 
comprised the melodic line and harmony were not substantially 
similar.213  Instead, Professor Jenkins explained that the songs are 
sonically similar with the use of falsetto vocals and “a cowbell to 
provide rhythmic accents.”214  However, as the falsetto and cowbell 
vocals were not notated in Gaye’s composition submitted to the 
Copyright Office, these two similar musical elements are not included 
in the analysis of substantial similarity.  She stated, “[t]hat’s what is 
lacking in the ‘Blurred Lines’ case, and why, based on the law, my 
students would have unanimously ruled for Pharrell and Thicke.”215  
However, a vital aspect of this mock trial was that the class correctly 
 
205 Newman, supra note 23. 
206 Id. 
207 Jennifer Jenkins, The “Blurred Lines” of Law, CTR. FOR STUDY PUB. DOMAIN, 
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predicted that the lay jurors would actually find that the Thicke Parties 
infringed Gaye’s song.216  Professor Jenkins explained that the Ninth 
Circuit intrinsic test may have misrepresented the jurors’ examination 
of copyright infringement.217  She explained, “[i]t is very difficult to 
compare ‘total concept and feel’ without erroneously taking into 
account all of the unprotectable elements.”218  The students’ 
evaluations of who should win, and who they predicted would actually 
win, indicate the questionable role of juries in making accurate 
judgments based on the current instructions given for the intrinsic test 
in these very difficult music cases. 
C. Music Theory, Borrowing, and Inspiration When 
Creating Musical Works 
Additionally, virtually all music is inspired by another genre, 
style, or musician in some way.219  In fact, “[i]n the field of popular 
songs, many, if not most, compositions bear some similarity to prior 
songs.”220  This section will argue that an artist’s growth in musical 
creativity and authenticity is nurtured by an artist being inspired by 
another artist.  
  In the Western classical music tradition, a musical piece is 
limited to a scale of only twelve notes.221  Harmonically, three notes 
are formed together to create a single chord, resulting in several three-
note chord combinations that can create a chord progression.222  
Theoretically, there is a massive number of chord progressions that 
could be created by playing different chords together.223  However, this 
tradition of music favors specific chord progressions as being “more 
conventional over others,” inevitably leading to continuously repeating 
chord progression patterns in all types of songs.224  For example, the 





219 Turville, supra note 24, at 218. 
220 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 2.05[B]. 
221 Brief of Public Knowledge as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Counter-
Defendants-Appellants at 4, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (CA No. 15-
56880). 
222 Id. (explaining that a series of chords create a single chord progression, which serves as 
the harmonic foundation for a song). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 4-5. 
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progressions among musicians in popular music.225  It is quite striking 
that this particular chord progression is continuously recycled by 
countless musicians throughout different periods of music history.226  
Musical experts state that this chord progression, along with its 
variations like the vi-IV-I-V progression, is commonly used by 
musicians because “it can be played over and over and return smoothly 
to the first chord each time,” while also providing “emotional heft.”227   
Additionally, the repetition of musical patterns in various types of 
musical works is exemplified by the recurrence of the authentic 
cadence V-I3 in Mozart’s Eine Kleine Nachtmusik and Disney’s Do 
You Want to Build a Snowman from the movie Frozen.228  Thus, these 
examples illustrate that the recurrence of a single musical pattern 
“encourages creativity” and “can support a multitude of creative 
works.”229   
Additionally, composers often borrow musical elements from 
other artists and musical works in order to evoke certain “emotional 
and psychological responses from listeners.”230  In fact, musical 
borrowing of prior works can be found in classical compositions, film 
scores, and vastly ranging musical genres.231  For instance, the 
famously “accelerating two-note pattern” in the film Jaws creates a 
psychological response of fear and danger in any audience member 
watching the film.232  While this musical theme is associated with 
Jaws, this two-note pattern was first utilized at the start of Dvořkák’s 
fourth movement of the Ninth Symphony From the New World in 
 
225 Id. at 5. 
226 See random804, Axis of Awesome, 4 Four Chord Song, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pidokakU4I (demonstrating a humorous performance of 
the popular chord progression I-V-vi-IV in many songs); see also Alan White, 73 Songs You 
Can Play With The Same Four Chords, BUZZFEED (Apr. 29, 2014, 9:56 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/73-songs-you-can-play-with-the-same-four-chords 
(listing 73 songs that use the chord progression I-V-vi-IV, including Journey’s “Don’t  Stop 
Believin,’” Andrea Bocelli’s “Time To Say Goodbye,” Toto’s “Africa,” Bon Jovi’s “It’s My 
Life,” Lady Gaga’s “Poker Face,” Kelly Clarkson’s “Behind These Hazel Eyes,” Adele’s 
“Someone Like You,” Elton John’s “Can You Feel The Love Tonight,” and The Beatles’ “Let 
It Be”). 
227 Marc Hirsh, Striking a Chord, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 31, 2008), 
http://archive.boston.com/ae/music/articles/2008/12/31/striking_a_chord/. 
228 Brief of Public Knowledge as Amicus Curiae, supra note 221, at 4-5. 
229 Id. at 6. 
230 Id. at 8. 
231 Id. at 13. 
232 Id. at 9. 
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order to dramatically introduce the main melody.233  This example 
shows that different genres of musical works frequently borrow 
musical patterns from one another to create a similar feeling of 
“dramatic tension.”234  Most importantly, it exemplifies that musical 
borrowing “is an important tool in the toolbox of composition, one that 
ought to be available to all musicians.”235 
In a way, the feel and groove of a song is analogous to the 
scènes à faire doctrine.236  In order to evoke a particular musical genre 
or era, there may be no other way to express this musical idea237 
without using elements that are inherent in that genre or song.238  
Because specific musical elements are essential for evoking a certain 
genre, the scènes à faire doctrine will prevent copyright infringement 
when applying these essential elements.239  Similarly, Professor Wu 
argued that:    
To suggest that this verdict will encourage better 
songwriting is to misunderstand the history of the arts. 
The freedom of artists and other creators to borrow 
from each other is connected with the principle that 
ideas cannot be copyrighted, a notion that is essential to 
free speech and artistic expression.240   
In this case, the groove is the equivalent of an idea or a scène à 
faire, meaning that the groove in “Got to Give It Up” cannot be 
copyrighted.241  In fact, the similarities between “Blurred Lines” and 
“Got to Give It Up” are derived from musical elements that are not 
 
233 Id. (illustrating that this two-note pattern was also used in the film Inception to evoke 
the same emotional response of urgency). 
234 Id. at 10. 
235 Id. 
236 See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Under the scenes a 
faire doctrine, when certain commonplace expressions are indispensable and naturally 
associated with the treatment of a given idea, those expressions are treated like ideas and 
therefore not protected by copyright.”).  For example, the Sixth Circuit stated that stock images 
of a college fraternity include “parties, alcohol, co-eds, and wild behavior.”  Stromback v. 
New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 296 (6th Cir. 2004). 
237 See infra text accompanying note 241 for an explanation that ideas are not copyrightable.   
238 See Jenkins, supra note 207 (“No one owns the 12 bar blues, or the I-IV-V chord 
progression, or the two-step, or a descending melodic line, regardless of who originated them.  
Many of the musical elements common to ‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got To Give It Up’ fall into 
these unprotectable categories.”). 
239 Id.   
240 Wu, supra note 17. 
241 See cases cited supra note 236. 
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/6
2019 THE BLURRED PROTECTION 751 
protectable.242  Precisely, comparable to the scènes à faire doctrine, an 
attempt to channel the feel or groove of another time period should not 
result in copyright infringement because certain elements are so 
natural and fundamental to a specific musical style.243  However, by 
finding that the Thicke Parties were liable for copyright infringement, 
the Ninth Circuit inaccurately likened the groove to a protectable idea 
under copyright law, which directly conflicts with Section 102(b) of 
the 1976 Act.244 
Moreover, if artists are unable to draw on their musical 
influences due to fear of copyright infringement, the degree of 
creativity in music will be severely limited.245  The possibility of 
diminished musical creativity directly conflicts with the Framers’ 
intent under the Constitution to encourage the creation of works in 
furtherance of art and science.246  It is unfathomable to consider what 
music would sound like today if past artists were ambivalent to grow 
and learn from their musical influences.247  In many famous classical 
works, composers such as Beethoven and Mozart masterfully recycled 
their own musical works and developed variations based on the works 
of other composers.248  For popular music, consider today’s standard 
of music “if the Beatles would have been afraid to draw from Chuck 
Berry, or if Elton John would have been afraid to draw from the 
 
242 Jenkins, supra note 207. 
243 Id. 
244 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 3; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
245 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 3, 10. 
246 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
247 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 10. 
248 See Zachary Lewis, Pop Artists Including Billy Joel, Alicia Keys, Sting Mine Music of 
Classical Composers When Writing Their Songs, PLAIN DEALER (July 1, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.cleveland.com/musicdance/index.ssf/2012/07/pop_artists_including_billy_jo.ht
ml (explaining that pop artists recycle the works of classical composers, just as classical 
composers reused their own works and the compositions of other composers.  For example, 
under Billy Joel’s vocals in the song “This Night,” listeners can hear the slow second 
movement of Beethoven’s “Pathetique” Sonata, which also draws on an earlier Mozart 
sonata); see also Anthony Tommasini, The Big 4 of Vienna: One Faces Elimination, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/arts/music/11vienna4.html 
(stating that Haydn taught Beethoven motivic development, or “bits and pieces of music” that 
serve as the musical structure for creating a symphony, and Beethoven expanded upon 
Haydn’s teachings when incorporating motivic development into his own works, such as the 
“Eroica” Symphony).   
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Beatles.”249  In fact, “it would also be difficult for the Gayes to imagine 
if their father had been afraid to draw from Ray Charles or Bo 
Didley.”250  It is possible that many of these songs would not even exist 
if they had received the level of scrutiny applied by the Ninth Circuit 
in evaluating “Blurred Lines.”251    
Lastly, consider an up-and-coming musician who is inspired by 
the artists that paved the way for a specific genre of music.252  This 
musician may aspire to be a pop star, a country singer, or even a rapper.  
By drawing inspiration from his musical influences, this musician 
learned the necessary fundamentals to write and compose songs.  Prior 
to the Ninth Circuit decision in Williams, this budding musician would 
not fear drawing on the influences of other musicians, so long as the 
song was made with his own creative expression.  However, the result 
in this hypothetical may be quite different after this case because the 
court’s decision blurs the line between an idea and the expression of 
an idea, along with blurring the distinction between being influenced 
by an artist and unlawfully copying that artist.253  Unlike the Thicke 
Parties that could afford a copyright infringement suit, most up-and-
coming musicians do not have the means to defend themselves in this 
manner.254  Thus, our budding musician will now “think twice before 
he or she writes a song that ‘feels’ like a Marvin Gaye song or any 
other artist’s song” in order to prevent future litigation.255  Therefore, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision creates a dangerous impediment to 
musical creativity as musicians will be overly cautious when making 
music because they will not know whether drawing inspiration from a 
song will result in copyright infringement.256   
Consequently, the jury’s task of determining the “total concept 
and feel” of two songs under the Ninth Circuit’s intrinsic analysis stage 
“simply does not work in a music context.”257  In particular, given that 
there are only a finite number of possible notes and chords, the courts 
 
249 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 10. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 17. 
252 In this paragraph, consider this hypothetical musician as a model for all budding and up-
and-coming musicians who would like to create music for everyone to hear. 




257 Id. at 12 n.4. 
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have recognized that some pieces will contain “common themes.”258  
In fact, Judge Learned Hand stated, “[i]t must be remembered that, 
while there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the 
musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer 
still suit the infantile demands of the popular ear.  Recurrence is not 
therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism.”259  Specifically, there is 
no clear test to determine whether a song evokes a similar feel or 
whether it infringes the copyright in another song.260  In this case, it is 
evident that “Blurred Lines” and “Got to Give It Up” are similar in 
their “sonic environment,” but the core elements of melody, rhythm, 
and lyrics are not similar.261  Therefore, in determining substantial 
similarity in musical works, the Ninth Circuit should create a more 
precise rule for determining the “total concept and feel of a work” so 
that musicians will know whether their inspiration and borrowing of 
another work constitute copyright infringement. 
D. Proposed Rule for the Intrinsic Analysis Test 
The decision in Williams v. Gaye illustrates that the Ninth 
Circuit should clarify the rule under the intrinsic analysis test for the 
jury’s determination of substantial similarity.  The proposed rule in this 
section will not recommend the elimination of the intrinsic analysis 
test or that the Ninth Circuit should develop a brand-new test for 
evaluating whether two works are substantially similar.  Instead, the 
Ninth Circuit should reevaluate how the jury is instructed in 
determining “whether the ordinary, reasonable person would find the 
total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”262   
As seen in this case, the intrinsic test presents the opportunity 
for an erroneous evaluation of the substantial similarity between two 
songs.  For instance, in cases involving celebrity musicians, the jury 
may be susceptible to applying their preconceived admiration or 
distaste for particular artists when determining whether copyright 
infringement has occurred.  Here, it is possible that the jurors’ musical 
preference for Gaye may have colored their interpretation of whether 
 
258 Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988). 
259 Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940). 
260 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
261 Post, supra note 14. 
262 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pasillas 
v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
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Thicke and Williams copied Gaye’s song.263  Also, it is possible that 
Thicke’s unreliable and shocking testimony about his drug use may 
have inappropriately swayed the jury’s finding of infringement.264  In 
these instances, the Ninth Circuit should remind the jury that only the 
musical elements in the songs are evaluated when considering whether 
copyright infringement occurred.265 
Additionally, while the jury is correctly told to consider the 
“total concept and feel” of two songs, the intrinsic test does not 
specifically state that the jury must not evaluate whether the overall 
feel, groove, or vibe of the two songs are substantially similar.  The 
Ninth Circuit should clearly state to the jury that it must only consider 
the “total concept and feel” of the objective elements identified by the 
expert musicologists during the extrinsic analysis phase.  By providing 
explicit instructions that the overall groove and feel of a song are not 
protected under copyright law, the Ninth Circuit will better inform and 
guide the jury.  As it may be difficult for the jurors to isolate the overall 
sound of a song from the individual musical elements, the Ninth 
Circuit should consider emphasizing the distinction between these two 
components.266  For example, the court can state that while two songs 
may have a similar vibe, there is no copyright infringement for an 
artist’s attempt to evoke the sound of another musical style, genre, or 
artist.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit should tell the jury that it must only 
find copyright infringement between songs that sound similar when an 
artist directly copies protectable musical elements.  Thus, the court 
must clearly and explicitly tell the jury that only the specific musical 
 
263 See Wu, supra note 17 (stating that while “Gaye is widely revered,” Thicke was viewed 
“as enormously unappealing” during the trial and many people view “Blurred Lines” as 
“morally objectionable”). 
264 See August Brown, Robin Thicke on ‘Blurred Lines’: ‘I was High on Vicodin and 
Alcohol’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:19 PM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/musi 
c/posts/la-et-ms-robin-thicke-blurred-lines-deposition-high-vicodin-alcohol-20140915-
story.html (discussing that Thicke admitted in his deposition testimony that he was intoxicated 
and on Vicodin while recording “Blurred Lines” and while giving interviews about the song 
to the media); see also Wu, supra note 17 (explaining that Williams wrote “Blurred Lines” 
and Thicke admitted that he did not write the song, meaning he most likely lied to Oprah 
Winfrey in a previous interview). 
265 This is critical because the Ninth Circuit inaccurately let the jury examine the overall 
groove of the songs in this case. 
266 Nicholas Booth, Backing Down: Blurred Lines in the Standards for Analysis of 
Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement for Musical Works, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 
128 (2016) (discussing that courts should make sure that the jury is clear on the difference 
between the copyrights in the composition and the recording for the intrinsic analysis test in 
order to produce accurate results in music copyright infringement cases). 
32
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/6
2019 THE BLURRED PROTECTION 755 
elements identified by the experts during the extrinsic analysis test are 
analyzed for substantial similarity.  A revised rule for the intrinsic 
analysis test is both essential and workable because the language only 
has to be modified to better assist the jury.  By changing the language 
of the intrinsic analysis test, the Ninth Circuit may potentially avoid 
erroneous jury verdicts, which will further encourage creativity for 
artists when producing musical works. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit decision in Williams v. Gaye has serious 
implications for the future of creativity in musical works.  In upholding 
the jury’s verdict that Thicke and Williams infringed Gaye’s song, 
when there was no similarity in the melody, lyrics, or harmonies, the 
Ninth Circuit essentially declared that the groove of a song is subject 
to copyright protection.  While the majority opinion emphasized that 
this case hinged on procedural grounds, the protections under the 1909 
Act, and a deferential standard of review, the implications on musical 
creativity in evoking a style fosters new concerns for musicians and 
artists.  Specifically, it is nearly impossible to say that a song is 
completely original without drawing inspiration from another artist, 
style, or genre.  If the groove of a song is protected under copyright 
law, musicians will be overly cautious about drawing on the style of 
another artist or genre, thereby stifling creativity.  It is vital for the 
Ninth Circuit to reconsider the intrinsic analysis test with respect to the 
groove or feel of a song to clearly signify the line between 
infringement and inspiration.  Therefore, with the addition of more 
specific and precise instructions for the jury during the intrinsic 
analysis test, the importance in copyright law of developing creative 
and imaginative musical works will remain preserved.    
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